.ENV configuration file available from the website level containing login data to the database and applications key,
SQL database dump file available from the website level containing the entire database dump along with user data and hashes of their passwords,
Settings configuration file available from the website level containing FTP login data to another server,
Susceptibility of Request Smuggling to the Client's web server,
Two vulnerabilities test of Cross-Site Scripting in the Client's web applications
Detected weak authorization data [username=guest, password=Qwertyuiop] to an application protected with Basic Auth help in the /protected/ directory,
CVE-2021-3129 vulnerability in the Laravel framework allowing for unauthorized code execution in the customer's infrastructure.,
An open MongoDB database on 4 servers which allows you to login without entering login and password,
An open Redis database thay allows you to login without entering login and password
Laravel storage/logs/laravel.log file from where attackers could read information about the application and database the configuration of URLs on the server,
Directory with user sessions from the application created in Laravel storage/logs/laravel.log framework from where attackers would be able to impersonate any user logged in to the application,
https://193.34.REDACTED.REDACTED//wp-content/debug.log A vulnerability of the Debug.log in Wordpress that contains sensitive data-logins, passwords, user sessions and customer email addresses,
https://redacted.pl/corehttps://REDACTED.pl/core - PHP-FPM shared file (core.1: ELF 64-bit LSB core file, x86-64, version 1 (SYSV), SVR4-style, from 'php-fpm: pool REDACTED.pl', real uid: 0, effective uid: 0, real gid: 0, effective gid: 0, execfn: '/usr/sbin/php5-fpm', platform: 'x86_64' ) contains application source, login, database credentials - very dangerous and HIGH vulnerability. One of the administrators mistakenly configured the php-FPM file in the application's document.root available from the Internet, from where attackers could read exactly what the PHP interpreter is doing - a very serious data leak stopped only thanks to the ReconMore service, because it was omitted in previous manual penetration tests.